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Abstract
The fear of becoming a victim of crime acts like barriers to retail trade for con-
sumers, where retailers attempt to reduce such barriers by enduring additional
costs such as insurance or security/surveillance costs; as a result, retail prices
are a¤ected by the possibility of crime. This paper attempts to measure such
e¤ects by considering the recent experience of the County of Sacramento, where
an anti-panhandling ordinance has been issued to protect the retailers. As an
application, a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach is employed to identify the e¤ects
of the ordinance on Sacramento gasoline prices at the retail level, by considering
the gasoline prices in neighbor counties as the control group of a natural experi-
ment. The results show that the anti-panhandling ordinance has resulted in lower
gasoline prices in the County of Sacramento.
JEL Classication: H73, K42
Key Words: Anti-Crime Laws; Gasoline Retail Prices; Gas-Station Level Analy-
sis; County of Sacramento
Department of Economics, Florida International University, Miami, FL 33199, USA; Tel: +1-305-
348-2316; Fax: +1-305-348-1524; E-mail: hyilmazk@u.edu
1. Introduction
The fear of victimization imposes indirect costs to society through its neg-
ative impact on local business establishments, especially retailers that make a
neighborhood a convenient and stable place to live and shop; e.g. see Gal-
lagher (1989), Greenbaum and Tita (2004) and Rosenthal and Ross (2010). It
has been shown that individuals perceive crime as highly visible signs of disor-
derly and disreputable behavior in the community, which a¤ect a communitys
social and economic vitality. Therefore, crime is perceived as one of the most seri-
ous urban problems where high-crime neighborhoods discourage individuals from
living, shopping, conducting business or seeking entertainment; e.g., see Fisher
(1991). Although the fear of victimization has shown to contribute to neigh-
borhood decline and deterioration, policy makers have given more importance
to residential crime, fear of crime, and various disorders such as homelessness,
prostitution, and abandoned buildings. However, the same attention has not
been provided for the neighborhood businesses until recently; e.g., see Gallagher
(1989) and Fisher (1991). Realizing this lack of attention, given the social and
economic e¤ects of crime on the local business establishments, many jurisdictions
have started special programs to prevent crime in the last two decades, includ-
ing a recent case by The County of Sacramento in 2015 to prohibit aggressive
panhandling.
In the U.S., the Supreme Court has held that panhandling/begging is a form
of speech that is protected by the Constitution1, but political divisions have suc-
cessfully outlawed "aggressive" forms of panhandling.2 Therefore, aggressive pan-
handling has been started being dened as a crime in certain neighborhoods. The
County of Sacramento is one of these divisions that has recently passed an ordi-
nance prohibiting panhandling that has become e¤ective on January 14th, 2015
as announced by the Sacramento County Sheri¤s Department. In particular, the
ordinance prohibits soliciting for cash in an aggressive or intrusive manner in any
public place,including within 35 feet from an automated teller machine (ATM),
within 200 feet of a vehicle at an intersection, within any vehicle stopped at a gas
station, on any tra¢ c median strip and on buses and city trains.
This paper investigates the short-run e¤ects of this ordinance on the equilib-
rium gasoline retail price in Sacramento County by using data at the station level.
Since the equilibrium price depends on both demand and supply conditions, the
e¤ects of the ordinance may be through (i) the consumer side where customers
may stop shying away from gas stations due to the fear of meeting aggressive pan-
1For example, see https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/497/720/case.html.
2Also see Smith (2005) who investigates the reasons behind the regulation of panhandling
across 71 U.S. cities and shows that cities with higher welfare benets are less likely to regulate
begging, while cities with higher crime rates, higher proportions of disabled citizens, and higher
proportions of collegeeducated citizens, and cities that are more densely populated are more
likely to regulate begging.
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handlers (as in Alrich and Reiss, 1976 or McPherson, 1978),3 or (ii) the producer
side where gas stations may stop facing additional costs (because of aggressive
panhandlers) such as insurance premiums to cover losses, security/surveillance
costs, lower prots due to shorter operating hours, replacing and repairing prop-
erty, or higher labor costs in order to compensate employees for higher risks of
working; e.g., see Steward (1986) and Fisher (1991). Within this context, the ordi-
nance would result in a higher demand when customers stop shying away from gas
stations, and it would result in a higher supply when gas stations face fewer costs.
Moreover, gas stations may also get involved in marketing e¤orts at the time of
(or right after) the ordinance (advertising a safer shopping environment) to fur-
ther shift the individual demand toward shopping in Sacramento County, at the
cost of their advertisement. Accordingly, the e¤ects of the ordinance on the equi-
librium gasoline price depends on the relative magnitude of such changes/shifts
in demand and supply conditions as well as their corresponding initial positions
(i.e., the price elasticities of demand and supply). In other words, without any
further evidence, the theory is silent, and we need an empirical investigation in
order to gure out such e¤ects.
It is important to emphasize that such changes in retail prices may be observed
even in the absence of the ordinance being fully e¤ective; the announcement itself
3Also see http://www.yelp.com/topic/sacramento-can-you-spare-any-change-for-gas-wink-
wink for the actual experience of customers in Sacramento, CA.
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(on January 14th, 2015) may be enough for customers to stop shying away from
gas stations or for gas stations to cut additional costs mentioned above, both due
to the changes in expectations. In particular, Sacramento Sheri¤s Department
has made an announcement on its web page as well as the social media on Jan-
uary 14th, 2015, and this announcement has been widely covered by the local
media, even starting from a week before the actual announcement date.4 On top
of this coverage on the internet, starting from January 14th, Sacramento Sheri¤s
Department has also o¤ered panhandlers iers and warnings about the ordinance,
where they have been informed that they could be ned or face jail time.5 There-
fore, one would expect to observe the e¤ects of the ordinance starting from its
e¤ective day of January 14th, 2015. Nevertheless, the observation of such e¤ects
also depends on timing or portion of gas stations taking the announcement into
account; i.e., if all gas stations consider the announcement immediately for set-
ting gasoline prices, one would expect to see the complete e¤ects of the ordinance
immediately, whereas if only some gas stations consider the announcement or if
gas stations consider it later, one would expect to see the complete e¤ects of the
ordinance in a longer period of time.
In terms of the methodology, we achieve our investigation by using a di¤erence-
4Among many others, see http://www.sacbee.com/news/local/article5638734.html
5See http://www.indystar.com/story/news/local/arden-lariviera/2015/01/16/new-
sacramento-county-ordinance-bans-panhandling-in-certain-areas/21848319/
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in-di¤erence approach where the gas stations located in the County of Sacramento
experiencing the policy change on January 14th, 2015 are analyzed as the treat-
ment group of a natural policy experiment, and the control group consists of gas
stations in the neighbor counties with no policy changes. Since the ordinance
restricting panhandling near gas stations is due to the Sacramento County law
(rather than market conditions), using a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach is a com-
pelling way to study the e¤ects of the ordinance on retail prices, and it is robust
to any identication/endogeneity problem. Since di¤erent gas stations may take
into account the announcement of the ordinance in di¤erent time periods, we also
consider alternative time intervals in our di¤erence-in-di¤erence investigation.
The benchmark results show that the gasoline prices have decreased in Sacra-
mento County right after panhandling is prohibited compared to the neighbor
counties. These short-run results are robust to the consideration of time xed
e¤ects across stations. Since the equilibrium retail prices may also depend on
retail characteristics such as the brand of the gas station, having a car wash or
a convenience store, or the exact location of the gas station within the neighbor-
hood, the benchmark investigation also considers brand xed e¤ects or station
xed e¤ects. Therefore, there is strong evidence for lower gasoline prices right
after the ordinance. It is implied that the changes in supply conditions (as dis-
cussed above) have been more e¤ective than the changes in demand conditions
in the determination of equilibrium gasoline prices. These benchmark results are
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further supported by longer-term before-and-after analyses, and robustness tests
considering outliers or gas stations that are closer to the county border, which all
suggest lower gasoline prices in Sacramento County after the ordinance.
In the related literature, the e¤ects of crime on sales and prots of the business
have been well established by many earlier studies such as by McPherson (1978)
or Alrich and Reiss (1976). The connection between panhandling and local eco-
nomic activity has also been achieved in the existing literature. In one strand
of the literature, studies such as by Foscarinis (1996) and Iwamoto (2007) show
that the panhandling deters customers from patronizing local businesses, which
results in fewer demand. However, such studies have not discussed/measured
the quantitative e¤ects of panhandling on the local economic activity; one of the
contributions of this paper is to bridge this gap.
Greenbaum and Tita (2004), who investigate business establishments in ve
large U.S. cities between 1987 and 1994, have shown that establishments relying
on face-to-face interaction such as retailers are more sensitive to changes in crime
in terms of lost sales due to fearful customers. Similarly, studies such as by Wilcox
et al. (2003), Warr (1990, 2000), Liska et al. (1988), and Skogan and Maxeld
(1981) have shown how fear of violence would change the behavior of consumers,
employees and entrepreneurs.6 Accordingly, the costs of local businesses highly
6Studies such as by Bingham and Zhang (2001) or Rosenthal and Ross (2010) show how
entrepreneurs take crime into account while deciding on their locations.
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depend on the existence of crime (due to the costs discussed above). The degree
of pass-through of these costs (to consumers) determine the pricing behavior of
local businesses through competition within and across the neighborhoods. In
addition to the existing literature, the main objective of this study is to measure
the change in such local business prices due to an anti-crime law (i.e., the ordinance
prohibiting panhandling in The County of Sacramento) by focusing on the gasoline
retail prices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the
panhandling ordinance in the Sacramento County. Section 3 achieves the empirical
investigation by introducing the empirical strategy and the data used. Section 4
concludes.
2. Sacramento County Panhandling Ordinance
On May 13, 2014, the Board of Supervisors of the County of Sacramento has
adopted an ordinance to ban aggressive panhandling in response to complaints
from suburban business leaders and residents. According to the ordinance, "ag-
gressive" is dened as conduct intended or likely to cause a reasonable person to
fear bodily harm to oneself or to another, to fear damage to or loss of property,
or otherwise to be intimidated into giving money or other thing of value; inten-
tionally touching or causing physical contact with another person or an occupied
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vehicle without that persons consent; persisting in closely following or approach-
ing a person, after the person has informed a solicitor that such person does not
want to be solicited or does not want to give money or any other thing of value
to the solicitor; or using violent gestures toward a person.
In particular, the Board of Supervisors have declared:
"The Board of Supervisors nds that an increase in aggressive solic-
itation throughout the County has become disturbing and disruptive to
residents and businesses and has contributed not only to the loss of access
to and enjoyment of places open to the public, but has also created an
enhanced sense of fear, intimidation and disorder."
where solicitation has been dened as asking, begging, requesting, and/or pan-
handling using the spoken, written, or printed word, or bodily gestures, signs or
other means with the purpose of obtaining an immediate donation of money or
other thing of value or soliciting the direct and immediate sale of goods or services.
The ordinance, which has been adopted to protect the safety and welfare of
the general public and improve the quality of life and economic vitality (accord-
ing to the o¢ cial ordinance), prohibits panhandling near nancial institutions
and ATMs; motor vehicles; median strips; driveways accessing shopping centers,
retail, and business establishments; public transportation vehicles and stops; and
gasoline stations and fuel pumps. Regarding the latter, the ordinance has declared
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"No person shall solicit from an operator or occupant of a motor vehicle while
such vehicle is stopped in a gasoline station or at a gasoline pump." As a penalty,
the ordinance has declared that any person who violates the ordinance shall be
guilty of an infraction, and any person who violates it more than two times within
a six month period shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
However, The American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California has sued
to stop enforcement of this new law due the violation of the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution in terms of broadly and over-inclusively prohibiting
free speech. On January 7th, 2015, the county settled the federal lawsuit brought
against the ordinance by changing it to include fund raising like the Sacramento
Metro Fire Departments "Fill the Boot" for burn victims campaign. Accordingly,
on January 14th, 2015, Sacramento Sheri¤s Department has made the following
announcement:7
"As a result of a December 2014 court settlement by the County of
Sacramento, the Sacramento Sheri¤s Department will be embarking on the
thirty day period of educating both our employees and the public in regards
to the enforcement of the Sacramento County Panhandling Ordinance (sec-
tions 9.81.010-070). E¤ective today, patrol o¢ cers who encounter persons
that may be unaware they are committing a violation of this ordinance will
7The announcment can be found at the following link:
http://www.sacsheri¤.com/media/Release.aspx?id=1277
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be handed an educational notice. While the Sheri¤s Department aims to re-
tain discretion during each violation encounter, our goal is to gain voluntary
compliance rather than issue a citation in every situation."
when the panhandling ordinance has o¢ cially become e¤ective. Therefore, we
accept January 14th, 2015 as the time of a policy change a¤ecting gas stations.
Since this announcement has been widely covered by the local media, even starting
from a week before the actual announcement date, and since Sacramento Sheri¤s
Department has also o¤ered panhandlers iers and warnings about the ordinance
starting from January 14th, 2015, where they have been informed that they could
be ned or face jail time, we expect to observe the e¤ects of the ordinance starting
from its e¤ective day of January 14th, 2015.
3. Empirical Investigation
3.1. Estimation Methodology and Data
The gas stations located in the County of Sacramento experiencing the policy
change on January 14th, 2015 are analyzed as the treatment group of a natural
policy experiment, where the control group consists of gas stations in the neigh-
bor counties (depicted in Figure 1) with no policy changes. Since the ordinance
restricting panhandling near gas stations is due to the Sacramento County law
(rather than market conditions), using a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach is a
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compelling way to study the e¤ects of the ordinance on retail prices, and it is
robust to any identication/endogeneity problem.
We start with investigating the short-run trends in gasoline prices before and
after January 14th in Figure 2, where the average gasoline prices of the treatment
group (i.e., the County of Sacramento) have been shifted such that the average
gasoline prices during the pre-treatment period are equalized across Sacramento
and neighboring counties in order to focus on trends over time (rather than scales).
As is evident, the gasoline price trends of the County of Sacramento and neighbor
counties are very similar before the policy change. This common trend during
the pre-treatment period is also supported by a formal test, where the hypothesis
of having an uncommon trend between Sacramento and neighboring counties is
rejected.8 However, the average prices across Sacramento and neighboring coun-
ties deviate from each other after the ordinance becomes e¤ective, when gasoline
8In technical terms, the pooled version of gasoline prices (at the station level) in Sacramento
and neighboring counties during the pre-treatment period are regressed on a time trend and its
interaction with a dummy representing the gas stations in the County of Sacramento. We test
the signicance of the interaction term in this regression; if it is signicant, there is evidence for
an uncommon trend across Sacramento and neighboring counties, otherwise, there is evidence
for a common trend. The regression results show that the time trend is negative and signicant
at the 5 percent level, whereas the interaction term is insignicant, suggesting that there is in
fact a common trend of gasoline prices across Sacramento and neighboring counties during the
pre-treatment period.
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prices in the County of Sacramento become lower, on average across stations.
Nevertheless, for robustness, we need a formal investigation in order to control
for all other factors that are specic to the gas stations, brands or time peri-
ods. Accordingly, in terms of the econometric model, we consider the following
expression for the retail price of gasoline in station s selling brand b at time t:
ln (RetailPricesbt) = 0 + 11 (Sacramentos)  PostReformt
+1 (Sacramentos) + s + b + t + "sbt (3.1)
where 1 (Sacramentos) is an indicator that the retailer is located in Sacramento
County, PostReformt is an indicator that the gas price is observed after the anti-
panhandling ordinance of Sacramento County, s represents station xed e¤ects
capturing the characteristics of station s that are constant over time (e.g., any
demand shifter across stations such as being in the treatment or the control group,
the geographical characteristics, having a car wash or a convenience store, etc.), b
represents brand-specic e¤ects (that are e¤ective in the absence of station xed
e¤ects), and t represents time xed e¤ects (based on the time of data collection)
capturing aggregate factors that would cause changes in the retail price even in
the absence of a policy change.
In this econometric model, it is important to emphasize that the identication
(of the e¤ects of the ordinance) is achieved through the time dimension (i.e., before
and after the implementation of the law) rather than the cross-sectional dimension
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of gas stations. Accordingly, station xed e¤ects would capture the characteristics
of gas stations that are common before and after the change in the law, whereas
the gas stations in Sacramento may experience a change in their prices only after
the change in the law (i.e., identication through the time dimension). In other
words, station xed e¤ects are essential in our investigation, consistent with the
regression specications in inuential studies such as by Bertrand et al. (2004).
The gasoline price data has been downloaded at midnight of each day from
MapQuest.9 MapQuest receives gasoline prices from Oil Price Information Service
(OPIS), a leading provider of petroleum data collecting gas price data based on
eet transaction data.10 MapQuest gas prices are updated as qualifying trans-
actions are processed by OPIS. The exact location of the gas station, together
with its brand and the approximate time of the gasoline-price update, is also pro-
vided by MapQuest. We analyze the days of January 13th and 15th in the formal
benchmark analysis, where we focus on the very same gas stations in the County
of Sacramento and neighbor counties. This corresponds to a one-day before and
after analysis. While the number of gas stations in the County of Sacramento is
68, it is 248 in neighbor counties.
For robustness, by taking into account the very same gas stations, we also
9The link is http://gasprices.mapquest.com/.
10Focusing on other topics and time periods, earlier studies such as by Abrantes-Metz et al.
(2006), Doyle and Samphantharak (2008), and Chandra and Tappata (2011) have also used this
data set.
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consider alternative before and after analyses. In particular, we achieve a ve-day
and a two-week before and after analyses on top of the benchmark analysis.
Moreover, we also consider alternative specications in order to test the ro-
bustness of the results regarding the denition of the dependent variable (i.e., logs
versus levels), outliers, or the proximity of the gas stations to the county border.
3.2. Estimation Results
The estimation results for the one-day before and after analysis are given in
Table 1, where the change in gasoline prices in the County of Sacramento (after
the policy change) is negative and signicant in all cases, with or without control
variables. Since the dependent variable is the log gasoline prices, the estimated
coe¢ cients suggest that the gasoline prices in the County of Sacramento have
been about 1:5 percent lower compared to the neighbor counties after the policy
change. This result is robust to the consideration of all control variables, including
station xed e¤ects, brand xed e¤ects or time xed e¤ects. Therefore, on top
of the graphical evidence in Figure 2, there is also econometric evidence for lower
retail prices due to the anti-panhandling ordinance in the County of Sacramento.
This result is further supported by high explanatory powers, especially when all
control variables are included in regression case (5) in Table 1.11
11It is important to emphasize that the results in Table 1 are robust to the clustering critique
of di¤-in-di¤ by Bertrand et al. (2004). In particular, these results already correspond to the
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Although the e¤ects of an anti-crime law on retail prices have been shown to be
negative in Table 1, there is more that we can learn from the columns of it. As is
evident, each control variable (i.e., each set of xed e¤ects) is important in explain-
ing the data better (by improving the explanatory power across columns). For
example, when we compare columns 1 and 3, we observe the contribution of hav-
ing time xed e¤ects which corresponds to an increase in the adjusted R-squared
about 0.28. Similarly, when columns 3 and 4 are compared, the contribution of
brand xed e¤ects corresponds to an increase in the adjusted R-squared about
another 0.08. However, the biggest contribution is achieved by retail character-
istics (captured by gas-station xed e¤ects) where the R-squared value increases
by about 0.45 between columns 4 and 5. Therefore, retail characteristics explain
the lions share of price changes, followed by time xed e¤ects and brand xed
e¤ects (that become ine¤ective when station xed e¤ects are considered in column
5). Although the explanatory power across columns change signicantly (due to
alternative control variables), it is encouraging for the results of this paper to
see that the negative e¤ects of the Sacramento County panhandling ordinance on
retail prices are very similar across columns of Table 1.
empirical solution to the problem of underestimated standard errors in Bertrand et al. (2004)
under their section titled "ignoring time series information."
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3.3. Robustness Checks
We consider the possibility that on the specic days of January 13th and
15th in the benchmark investigation, the results may be a¤ected by some other
events that cannot be captured in this study. Accordingly, we consider alternative
robustness checks in this subsection.
The rst robustness check is achieved by considering a ve-day before and after
analysis by using the price data from the specic days of January 9th and 19th.
The results are given in Table 2. As is evident, the change in gasoline prices in the
County of Sacramento (after the policy change) is negative and signicant in all
cases, although the standard errors di¤er across columns 1 and 5. The estimated
coe¢ cient representing the policy change corresponds to a price reduction in the
County of Sacramento of about 4 percent compared to the neighbor counties.
Although the explanatory power of the regressions are still high, they are lower
compared to the corresponding values in Table 1, mostly due to the possibility
that many other factors e¤ecting the prices have changed over the considered
period.
The second robustness check is achieved by considering a two-week before and
after analysis where the price data obtained from the specic days of January 1st
and 27th are used. The corresponding results are given in Table 3 where, again,
the change in gasoline prices in the County of Sacramento (after the policy change)
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is negative and signicant in all cases. The magnitude of the coe¢ cient, however,
is much higher compared to the earlier tables, where the prices in the County of
Sacramento have declined about 6 percent after the policy change, compared to
the neighbor counties.
Another robustness check is achieved by considering all the days in Tables 1-3
(i.e., January 1st, 9th, 13th, 15th, 19th, and 27th). The corresponding results are
given in Table 4 where the retail price reduction in the County of Sacramento is
negative and signicant in all regressions, with or without any control variables.
When we replace the log of gasoline retail prices on the left hand side of Equation
?? with the level of gasoline retail prices by using the same data as in Table 4, the
corresponding results are given in Table 5. As is evident, the retail price reduction
in the County of Sacramento is again negative and signicant in all regressions,
with or without any control variables.
In order to test the robustness of the results regarding outliers, we consider
another alternative specication by ignoring the observations below 5th percentile
and above 95th percentile (of percentage changes in gasoline prices) by using the
same data as in Table 4. As is evident in Table 6, the results (of lower retail prices
in the County of Sacramento) are robust to the consideration of such outliers as
well.
Finally, in order to investigate whether the gasoline retail prices in gas stations
closer to the county border have been a¤ected in a di¤erent way, we split the set of
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gas stations in Sacramento into two subsets based on their minimum distance to
the closest station in neighbor counties. Accordingly, one set covers the stations
that are relatively closer to their closest stations in the neighbor county (i.e.,
its minimum distance is below the median minimum distance across Sacramento
stations), while the other set covers the stations that are relatively remote from
their closest stations in neighbor counties. The corresponding results in Table 7
show that when all control variables are considered, the retail price reduction in
Sacramento stations that are closer to the county border is relatively higher (in
absolute terms) than in ones that are remote from the county border. It is implied
for Sacramento stations near the county border that for instance a marketing e¤ort
is more likely to pay o¤ in that it attracts patrons from other counties. Therefore,
competition between the stations in the County of Sacramento that are closer to
the county border and the neighbor counties might also have played an important
role in the determination of the e¤ects of the ordinance on retail prices.
4. Concluding Remarks
Crime is costly for retail establishments. Since there are no pure data available
for such costs, the measurement of these costs requires an empirical strategy
that is robust to any identication/endogeneity problem. By considering the
recent case of Sacramento County panhandling ordinance, this study has achieved
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such a robust investigation by using a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach where the
gas stations located in the County of Sacramento experiencing the policy change
on January 14th, 2015 are analyzed as the treatment group of a natural policy
experiment, and the control group consists of gas stations in the neighbor counties
with no policy changes.
The results have shown that during a period with a decreasing general trend in
gasoline prices, the retail prices in Sacramento County (measured by gas-station
level gasoline prices) have decreased further compared to the neighbor counties
after the ordinance has been announced. These results are robust to the consid-
eration of time xed e¤ects, brand xed e¤ects or other retailer characteristics
(measured by gas-station xed e¤ects), as well as any potential outliers in the
sample. According to the results of a further analysis, competition between the
stations in the County of Sacramento that are closer to the county border and the
neighbor counties might also have played an important role in the determination
of the e¤ects of the ordinance on retail prices.
It has also been shown that retail prices are explained most by retailer charac-
teristics, followed by time and brand xed e¤ects. Accordingly, for future research,
one path may be to investigate how retailer characteristics (such as having a car
wash or a convenience store) interact with the e¤ects of anti-crime laws on retail
prices, although it was not the focus of this paper due to the lack of available
data.
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Figure 1 – County of Sacramento and Neighbor Counties 
 
 
Notes: The shape files that have been used to create this map have been obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau.  
Figure 2 – Average Gasoline Prices in Sacramento County versus Neighbor 
Counties 
 
Notes: In order to focus on trends over time (rather than scales), average gasoline prices of the 
treatment group (i.e., the County of Sacramento) have been shifted such that the average value of 
pre-treatment gasoline prices are equalized across Sacramento and neighboring counties.  
  
Table 1 – Benchmark Estimation Results: One-Day Before and After Analysis 
 Dependent Variable: Log Gasoline Prices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(𝑆𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑠)
∗𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡 -0.0151+ -0.0151+ -0.0151+ -0.0151+ -0.0151* 
 (0.00823) (0.00833) (0.00777) (0.00778) (0.00615) 
      
Brand Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES YES 
Time Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES YES 
Station Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO YES 
Sacramento Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
      
# of Stations in Sacramento County 68 68 68 68 68 
# of Stations in Neighbor Counties 248 248 248 248 248 
Total # of Stations 316 316 316 316 316 
Sample Size 632 632 632 632 632 
      
Overall Adjusted R-Squared 0.003 0.207 0.287 0.368 0.815 
Notes: ***, **, *, and + represent significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors in parenthesis represent cluster-
robust measures at the county level.  
Table 2 – Alternative Estimation Results: Five-Day Before and After Analysis 
 Dependent Variable: Log Gasoline Prices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(𝑆𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑠)
∗𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡 -0.0383*** -0.0383*** -0.0383*** -0.0383*** -0.0383*** 
 (0.00720) (0.00734) (0.00656) (0.00654) (0.00414) 
      
Brand Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES YES 
Time Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES YES 
Station Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO YES 
Sacramento Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
      
# of Stations in Sacramento County 68 68 68 68 68 
# of Stations in Neighbor Counties 248 248 248 248 248 
Total # of Stations 316 316 316 316 316 
Sample Size 632 632 632 632 632 
      
Overall Adjusted R-Squared 0.023 0.205 0.283 0.353 0.659 
Notes: ***, **, *, and + represent significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors in parenthesis represent cluster-
robust measures at the county level.  
Table 3 – Alternative Estimation Results: Two-Week Before and After Analysis 
 Dependent Variable: Log Gasoline Prices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(𝑆𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑠)
∗𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡 -0.0631*** -0.0631*** -0.0631*** -0.0631*** -0.0631*** 
 (0.00693) (0.00693) (0.00673) (0.00669) (0.00448) 
      
Brand Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES YES 
Time Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES YES 
Station Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO YES 
Sacramento Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
      
# of Stations in Sacramento County 68 68 68 68 68 
# of Stations in Neighbor Counties 248 248 248 248 248 
Total # of Stations 316 316 316 316 316 
Sample Size 632 632 632 632 632 
      
Overall Adjusted R-Squared 0.057 0.194 0.22 0.279 0.432 
Notes: ***, **, *, and + represent significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors in parenthesis represent cluster-
robust measures at the county level.  
Table 4 – Alternative Estimation Results: Full-Sample Before and After Analysis 
 Dependent Variable: Log Gasoline Prices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(𝑆𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑠)
∗𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡 -0.0388*** -0.0388*** -0.0388*** -0.0388*** -0.0388*** 
 (0.00443) (0.00448) (0.00415) (0.00413) (0.00294) 
      
Brand Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES YES 
Time Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES YES 
Station Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO YES 
Sacramento Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
      
# of Stations in Sacramento County 68 68 68 68 68 
# of Stations in Neighbor Counties 248 248 248 248 248 
Total # of Stations 316 316 316 316 316 
Sample Size 1896 1896 1896 1896 1896 
      
Overall Adjusted R-Squared 0.025 0.199 0.295 0.361 0.700 
Notes: ***, **, *, and + represent significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors in parenthesis represent cluster-
robust measures at the county level.  
Table 5 – Alternative Estimation Results: Full-Sample Before and After Analysis, Level of Prices 
 Dependent Variable: Gasoline Prices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(𝑆𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑠)
∗𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡 -0.0992*** -0.0992*** -0.0992*** -0.0992*** -0.0992*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.00757) 
      
Brand Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES YES 
Time Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES YES 
Station Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO YES 
Sacramento Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
      
# of Stations in Sacramento County 68 68 68 68 68 
# of Stations in Neighbor Counties 248 248 248 248 248 
Total # of Stations 316 316 316 316 316 
Sample Size 1896 1896 1896 1896 1896 
      
Overall Adjusted R-Squared 0.026 0.189 0.288 0.352 0.699 
Notes: ***, **, *, and + represent significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors in parenthesis represent cluster-
robust measures at the county level.  
Table 6 – Alternative Estimation Results: Full-Sample Before and After Analysis, Controlling for Outliers 
 Dependent Variable: Log Gasoline Prices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(𝑆𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑠)
∗𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡 -0.0287*** -0.0293*** -0.0290*** -0.0289*** -0.0338*** 
 (0.00288) (0.00277) (0.00259) (0.00257) (0.00230) 
      
Brand Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES YES 
Time Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES YES 
Station Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO YES 
Sacramento Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
      
# of Stations in Sacramento County 68 68 68 68 68 
# of Stations in Neighbor Counties 248 248 248 248 248 
Total # of Stations 316 316 316 316 316 
Sample Size 1744 1744 1744 1744 1744 
      
Overall Adjusted R-Squared 0.042 0.353 0.502 0.534 0.581 
Notes: ***, **, *, and + represent significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors in parenthesis represent cluster-
robust measures at the county level.  
Table 7 – Alternative Estimation Results: Full-Sample Before and After Analysis, Stations at the Country Border 
 Dependent Variable: Log Gasoline Prices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(𝑆𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑠)
∗𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡 -0.0457*** -0.0422*** -0.0387*** -0.0368*** -0.0424*** 
(Closer to County Border) (0.00595) (0.00578) (0.00553) (0.00552) (0.00498) 
      
      
(𝑆𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑠)
∗𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡 -0.0320*** -0.0354*** -0.0390*** -0.0408*** -0.0353*** 
(Remote from County Border) (0.00469) (0.00495) (0.00501) (0.00498) (0.00311) 
      
Brand Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES YES 
Time Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES YES 
Station Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO YES 
Sacramento Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
      
# of Stations in Sacramento County 68 68 68 68 68 
# of Stations in Neighbor Counties 248 248 248 248 248 
Total # of Stations 316 316 316 316 316 
Sample Size 1896 1896 1896 1896 1896 
      
Overall Adjusted R-Squared 0.026 0.199 0.294 0.361 0.701 
Notes: ***, **, *, and + represent significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors in parenthesis represent cluster-
robust measures at the county level.  
